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Spawning the SEC
HENRY LAURENCE °

INTRODUCTION

Has the globalization of the world economy caused convergence in the
economic or regulatory policies of different countries? If so, are the standards
converging at higher or lower regulatory standards? The evidence presented
in this Article suggests that in at least one area-the regulation of financial
markets-there has been a significant degree of institutional convergence
across three major countries and that convergence has been toward an
American model of higher regulatory standards of consumer protection.
One of the immediate results of the Asian currency crisis was the
establishment of the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) in South Korea in
April 1998. Yet this reform is only the latest in a broad trend in which
different countries are adopting American-style institutions of investor
protection. Within the past decade, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan
have all created new bureaucratic agencies responsible for supervising
financial markets and ensuring high standards of investor protection on stock
exchanges. The British founded the Securities and Investments Board (SIB)
in 1986. The Japanese founded the Shoken Torihiki Kanshi Ii Inkai (Securities
and Exchange Surveillance Commission or SESC) in 1992. The Germans
founded the Bundessaufsichtamt fur den Wertpapierhandel (Federal
Supervisory Office for Securities Dealing) in 1994. All four new agencies
resemble each other in several important respects, and all were modeled, at
least in part, on the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) established in 1934. The creation of these agencies, therefore,
represents a significant convergence of the ways in which these countries
regulate their financial markets.
This institutional convergence is theoretically interesting for three
reasons. First, convergence undermines the predictions of a number of
scholars of comparative politics who argue that individual countries will retain
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unique regulatory and economic structures indefinitely. Second, reform in
each country was the result of a complex interaction of external economic
factors and national political battles, making it impossible to give simple
causal priority to either domestic or international variables. Finally,
convergence has been toward a higher standard of regulation, defying the
expectation that globalization will result in a competition in deregulator laxity.
In this Article, I examine the origins of reform in these four countries; and
I argue that the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany all consciously chose
to remodel their institutions of financial oversight along broadly American
lines.' However, all countries, beginning with the United States, reformed
their regulatory institutions in response to predominantly domestic political
pressures. All four governments introduced new "watchdog" agencies in the
face of domestic criticism of existing regulatory arrangements. This criticism
was in each case prompted by financial scandals that revealed corrupt
practices in stock and bond markets, along with the exploitation of investors
by banks, brokers, and other financial intermediaries.
While the
circumstances of scandal were different in each country, they shared certain
common features stemming from the similar nature of financial corruption
across countries-a corruption which stems from the huge information
asymmetries between providers and users of financial services.
However, the internationalization of financial markets--defined as an
increase in the value of cross-border economic transactions relative to
domestic transactions 2-played a vital role in determining the form of the
regulatory outcomes in every case except the United States. First, financial
integration changed the preferences of many key actors with regard to the
appropriate type and -level of regulation. Local bankers, brokers, and
regulators who had previously been opposed to regulatory reform came to
realize that foreign investors were deterred from doing business in markets
perceived as unfair. By contrast, regulatory structures that provided strong
enforcement of investor protection laws were seen as a benefit in attracting
foreign business. In other words, internationalization changed the economic
incentives of both private firms and national governments in favor of higher
regulatory standards. Second, internationalization facilitated the use of
American regulatory institutions as a model for other countries. Financial

1. The case of the Korean FSA, while fascinating, is too recent for adequate discussion in this
Article.
2. I am indebted to Ken Oye for this definition.
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internationalization encouraged such emulation in two ways. First, by
increasing the general level of international cooperation and discussion
between national regulatory authorities; and, second, by increasing the
familiarity of national financial firms and investors with foreign regulatory
structures. In this regard, the perceived success of the American regulatory
model in achieving the goal of investor protection was a key component of its
adoption in other countries.
In Part I, I briefly review the literature on internationalization and
convergence, highlighting the debate between those who expect convergence
and those who do not. In Part H, I consider predictions about whether,
assuming that there is regulatory convergence, it will be toward higher or
lower standards.
I then discuss the cases of institutional reform
chronologically in Part Ill. The four countries under discussion-the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan-present a "hard case" for
the convergence thesis. They are among the biggest economies in the world
and should, therefore, be among the most immune to the influence of
international pressures for change. More importantly, they have until recently
been very distinct from one another in terms of political institutions,
regulatory traditions, and financial systems. Indeed, many scholars use these
four countries not merely to illustrate but to define different models of
financial regulation.' To see institutional convergence in these countries
would, therefore, be a surprising and important finding.
I. CONVERGENCE OR DIVERSITY?

One of the most controversial debates within the subfield of international
political economy concerns the degree to which internationalization has
caused cross-national policy convergence as formerly sovereign States react
to the pressure of international competition with common policy responses.
I define convergence as the process by which the rules, regulations, or
political institutions governing economic activity in different countries
become more similar. Under this definition, regulatory convergence implies
that regulations in two or more countries become more similar over time, but
it does not necessarily imply that regulatory structures are, or will become,
identical.

3. See, e.g., JOHN ZYsMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKErS, N GROWrH (1983) (focusing on the United
States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan).
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There are good theoretical grounds for expecting that at least some degree
of cross-national policy convergence will follow an increase in global
economic integration. Internationalization allows holders of mobile assets to
pick and choose the country in which they do business, and their decisions
will be based at least in part on the relative attractiveness of each country's
policies. International portfolio investors decide where to put their money by
comparing different fiscal and monetary policies. Multinational corporations
planning foreign direct investment will take into account different legal and
regulatory structures. Accordingly, countries wishing to attract international
businesses will need to tailor their monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies to
the standards of the international marketplace." The result is a competitive
dynamic in which policy choices in different countries converge on those most
preferable to internationally mobile businesses.'
Many scholars argue that in recent years regulatory reform in advanced
industrial democracies has indeed demonstrated convergence. John Goodman
and Louis Pauly examine the liberalization of capital markets in advanced
industrial democracies and conclude that "the fundamental convergence in the
direction of capital [market liberalization] noted in all of our case studies
suggests that systemic forces are now dominant in the financial area."6
Michael Webb examines changes in the patterns of international coordination
of macroeconomic adjustment policies under the impact of international
capital market integration. He, too, identifies a common pattern of policy
shifts from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, caused by the structural pressure

4. This dynamic cuts in two ways. Governments are faced with the twin pressures of attracting
foreign firms into the country and preventing the exit of domestic firms to other, more economically
attractive, countries.
5. This process is well described by Kurzer, who writes that "[h]igh capital mobility and deepening
financial integration prompt governments to remove or alter institutions and practices objectionable to
business and finance." PAuEr KURZER, BUSINESS AND BANKING: POLMCAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION INWESTERN EUROPE 245 (1993).
6. John B. Goodman & Louis W. Pauly, The Obsolescence of Capital Controls: Economic
Management in an Age of Global Markets, 46 WORLD POL. 50, 80-81 (1993). Notice that these authors
infer the power of mobile capital from the evidence of cross-national policy convergence. See also Louis
W. Pauly, National Financial Structures, CapitalMobility and InternationalEconomic Rules: The
Normative Consequences of East Asian, European, and American Distinctiveness, 27 POL'Y ScL. 343
(1994).
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of globalization." David Andrews also argues that the recent increase in
capital mobility exercises a common, systemic influence on the policy choices
of individual States
On the other hand, relatively equal numbers of scholars reject the
"convergence thesis" and argue that States still pursue diverse policy choices.
Jeff Garret examines the hypothesis that international financial integration
will lead to an erosion of the Keynsian welfare policies of West European
States and concludes that, although increased capital integration over the past
twenty years has exerted "powerful pressures for convergence in economic
policies,"9 such convergence has not happened, and that "the evidence on
fiscal policy conflicts sharply with the convergence thesis.' '0 Michael
Loriaux argues that regulatory reform in the 1980s in France was the strategic
choice of a rational State actor. "The French state sought through
liberalization to regain control over its monetary authority and not ... to
surrender the future evolution of the French political economy to the laws of
the marketplace."" Sofia Perez explicitly rejects the convergence thesis in her
study of credit regulation in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. 2 The fact
that some countries adopted selective credit regulation while others did not

7. Michael C. Webb, International Economic Structures, Government Interest, and International
Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies, 45 INT'L ORG. 309, 310-13 (1991); see also
MICHAEL C. WEBB, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY COORDINATION: INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT
SINCE 1945 (1995).
8. David M. Andrews, Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of
International Monetary Relations, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 193 (1994); see also DAVID M. MEERSCHWAM,
BREAKING FINANCIAL BOUNDARIES: GLOBAL CAPITAL, NATIONAL DEREGULATION, AND FINANCIAL
SERVICES FIRMS (1991); SAM L HAYES III & PHILLIP M. HUBBARD, INVESTMENT BANKING: A TALE OF
THREE CITIES (1990); RALPH BRYANT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1987); George
Stigler, The Regularities of Regulation, in FINANCIAL DEREGULATION I (Richard Dale ed., 1986). In the
popular press, the "convergence thesis" is well represented. See GREGORY J.MILLMAN, THE VANDALS'
CROWN: HOW REBEL CURRENCY TRADERS OVERTHREW THE WORLD'S CENTRAL BANKS (1995); RICHARD
O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY (1992); KENICHI OHMAE, THE
BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY INTHE INTERLINKED ECONOMY (1990).
9. Geoffrey Garrett, Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy, 49
INT'L ORG. 657, 657 (1995).
10. Id. at 659. See also Geoffrey Garrett & Peter Lange, Internationalization, Institutions, and
Political Change, 49 INT'L ORG. 627, 627-29 (1995) (arguing against the functionalist reasoning that
assumes changes in actor preferences caused by international economic changes hardly ever map cleanly
onto domestic political outcomes).
11. MICHAEL LORiAUX, FRANCE AFTER HEGEMONY: INTERNATIONAL CHANGE AND FINANCIAL
REFORM 14 (1991).
12. Sofia Perez, Macroeconomic Choices and Institutional Change: The Politics of Financial
Interventionism and its Abandonment in Post-War Europe (paper presented to the annual 1995 meeting
of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in Chicago).
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prompts her to argue that "domestic and politically motivated macroeconomic
policy choices by government officials play a much greater role in driving
change and determining regulatory outcomes than is generally recognized."' 3
Three recent studies of financial reform in Japan, two of which look also
at the United Kingdom, reject the view that international factors played a
determining role in prompting regulatory change and argue against the
convergence thesis. Ulricke Schaede offers one of the clearest defenses of the
view that no policy convergence has occurred and that Japan has retained
distinctive institutions. She writes that within the Japanese regulatory
framework "there is no indication whatsoever of convergence" with the United
States' system "or any other system of capitalism."' 4 Changes in regulations
were, she writes, "a pragmatic adaptation to the ways in which the world is
turning on Japan" revealing no underlying change in the way the Japanese
public or bureaucracy conceive of regulation." Steven Vogel argues that there
are still nationally distinct patterns of regulatory change and distinguishes
between the centralized, methodical, controlled, and "bureaucrat-led"
regulation in Japan and the more fragmentary, speedy, and marketized reform
process in the UK. 6 In the case of Japan, he argues that bureaucrats within
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) "have still managed to run their financial
revolution their way" and that "the evidence from the financial system reform
case strongly supports my contention that MOF officials have followed their
own priorities-and not those of financial institutions or party politicians."' 7
Finally, Andrew Sobel writes of changes in global financial markets that "the
international outcome [of financial integration] is solidly rooted in domestic

13. Id. at 2.
14. Ulricke Schaede, Change and Continuity in JapaneseRegulation (Haas School of Business
Working Paper No. 66, 1994), available at <http://brie.berkely.eduJ-briewww/pubs/wpwp66>.
15. Id.
16. Steven K. Vogel, The BureaucraticApproach to the FinancialRevolution: Japan'sMinistry of
Finance and FinancialSystem Reform, 7 GOVERNANCE 219, 222-23 (1994) [hereinafter Vogel, The
BureaucraticApproach to the FinancialRevolution];see also STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE
RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (1996).
17. Vogel, The BureaucraticApproach to the FinancialRevolution, supra note 16, at 219, 237
(alternation in original).
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policy dilemmas and distributional debates,"'" and that "[financial] markets
remained distinctively national."' 9
The disagreements between those who see policy convergence and those
who do not can only partly be explained as a matter of emphasis or as the
consequence of different definitions of convergence. The disagreements also
stem from a more fundamental dispute over the relative importance of
international versus domestic level factors in explaining national policy
outcomes." Both sides appear to see policy convergence as prima facie
evidence for the greater importance of international (or systemic) level forces
in driving domestic policy reform. Accordingly, the interpretation of the
empirical evidence for whether convergence has occurred has become highly
contentious. Since the issue of convergence is essentially an empirical one,
one of the main purposes of this Article is to bring new evidence to bear on
the debate. In doing so, however, I do not subscribe to the position that
arguing that there has been policy convergence necessarily means arguing that
international forces now play a unique causal role in shaping national policy
outcomes.
IU.DEREGULATION OR REREGULATION?
Assuming that we do expect regulatory convergence, upon what standard
will regulations converge? There are at least two competing hypotheses: the
"competition in laxity" and the "race to the top." The "competition in laxity"
hypothesis posits that regulations are costly to business.2' Therefore,
businesses will whenever possible migrate to the country with the lowest level
of regulations. As soon as financial investors are able to transact in foreign
markets, they will flock to the country with the lowest level of regulations.
Ralph Bryant writes that because:

18. ANDREw C. SOBEL, DOMESTIC CHOICES, INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 19 (1994)

19. Id. at 143.
20. This is,
of course, the essence of the "second image reversed" debate. For the classic works on
this debate, see PETER J. KATZENsTEIN, SMALL STATES INWORLD MARKETS: INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN
EUROPE (1985); Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The InternationalSources of Domestic
Politics,32 INT'L ORG. 881 (1978). See also INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert O.
Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996).
21. FINANCE AND WORLD PoLmcs: MARKETS, REGIMES AND STATES INTHE POST-HEGEMONIC ERA
15 (Philip G. Cemy ed., 1993) [hereinafter FINANCE AND WORLD POLrricS].
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Financial intermediation is more "footloose" than most other
economic activities .

.

. the scope exists for an individual

locality or nation to try to lure financial activity within its
borders by imposing less stringent regulation, taxation, and
supervision than that prevailing elsewhere... [that] can be
described-provocatively-as a "competition in laxity."22
Charles Kindleberger's discussion of the same phenomenon includes the
prediction that "[d]eregulation may induce the discarding of safeguards that
were considered important in ensuring the protection of the ordinary investor:
...prohibitions against insider trading and the like."2 Adherents to the
"competition in laxity" view, then, expect that the increased
internationalization of finance will be accompanied by a "race to the bottom"
where States compete for financial business by lowering regulatory
standards.24 Yet such a race to the bottom has not always happened. On the
contrary, although deregulation follows internationalization on some issues,
a shift to higher standards of regulation has occurred in others. This turns the
"competition in laxity" theory on its head.
The "race to the top" hypothesis predicts that in an open world economy
States will engage in competitive reregulation. The underlying logic is much
the same as that for the competition in laxity. The only difference is in the
expectations of business preferences, which in this model are assumed to be
for higher rather than lower regulatory standards. Barry Weingast, for
example, accounts for the rapid growth of the United States economy in the
1880s by noting that there were few barriers to capital movement across state
boundaries, and that the states competed with each other to attract capital by

22. BRYANT, supra note 8, at 139. See also FINANCE AND WORLD POLrICS, supra note 21.
23. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 72 (1987).
24. A very striking example of the desire of certain types of business to migrate to lax regulatory
climes is the recently-revealed copper trading losses incurred by Sumitomo Corporation on the London
Metal Exchange (LME). The LME had much more lax rules than its rival, New York's Commodities
Exchange (Comex), over issues of disclosure of trading positions, off-exchange trading, credit
arrangements, price reporting, punishment for infringement of regulations, and the ability of regulators to
trade on the exchange. Perhaps as a result of this laxity, trading volume of copper on the LME is nearly
twenty times the volume on Comex. It will be interesting to see whether the revelation of Sumitomo's
market manipulation will result in any strengthening of regulation on the LME. Stephanie Strom, A Market
Ripe for Manipulation,N. Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at DI, D3.
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promising to create secure property rights.5 More recently, David Vogel
argued that increased levels of international trade have been accompanied by
an upward shift in the regulatory standards for consumer and environmental
protection. In his words, the "California effect" has outweighed the
"Delaware effect. '26 Vogel notes that this shift has three components:
First, to the extent that stricter regulations represent a source
of competitive advantage for domestic firms, the latter may
be more likely to support them. Second, rich nations which
have enacted greener product standards for foreign producers
to adjust to them in order to continue to enjoy market access.
Third, agreements to reduce trade barriers can provide richer
and more powerful greener nations with the opportunity to
pressure other nations into adopting stricter product and
production standards."
In summary, then, the literature on comparative politics and international
political economy leaves two important questions open. First, are regulatory,
and other, policies converging across different countries, or do individual
countries retain distinctive institutional structures and policies? Second, to the
extent that policy convergence does occur, toward what standard are countries
moving-the higher or the lower?

M.

INVESTOR PROTECTION REGULATION IN SECURITIES MARKETS

The following cases examine how different countries developed
institutional mechanisms to regulate and monitor the conduct of business on
securities markets. I regard the issue of investor protection as essentially a

25. Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as GovernanceStructures: The Political Foundations of Secure
Markets, 149 J. INsT'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 287, 295 (1993).
26. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL

ECONOMY 5-6 (1995). Delaware has the least demanding state laws covering incorporation, so companies
who want to avoid excessive state regulation would set up their headquarters there. By contrast, California
sets high regulatory standards for companies incorporated there.
27. Id. at 259-60.
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case of consumer protection.28 Investors in stocks, bonds, and other types of
securities face two kinds of risk. The first is market risk: the possibility that
the stock they buy will fall in price. This is not something that regulation can
(or should) prevent, and most governments follow the doctrine of caveat
emptor-"let the buyer beware." However, investors also face "transaction
risk," which is the possibility that the banker or broker through whom they
deal may be dishonest and rip them off, for example, by selling them stock at
an artificially inflated price or by "insider trading" of stock. Financial markets
are characterized by high information asymmetries and inherent principalagent problems, so better-informed brokers have plenty of opportunities to
exploit investors, especially individual "retail" investors. This is the kind of
"market failure" problem that regulations can and should address. However,
whether governments will provide investor protection regulations, and of what
sort, are open questions. All regulations have distributional consequences and
are therefore subject to political conflict.29
In Parts IV through VII, I show that until the 1980s all four countries had
employed different regulatory strategies to protect investors. However, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan have recently been moving toward the
American approach.
IV. THE UNITED STATES: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1934
The SEC was established in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street crash.
Prior to the 1930s, no national regulation of the securities industry existed,
although individual states had enacted various antifraud laws. The
coordinated lobbying efforts of the securities industry, spearheaded by the
Investment Bankers Association, had ensured that the few state laws in place
were full of exemptions.' The Hoover administration, indeed, had actively
resisted proposals to enact federal regulatory standards for the security

28. See C.A.E. GOoDHART, MONEY, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY (2nd ed. 1989) (discussing

market failure and regulation in financial markets).
29. For the classic texts on the politics of regulation, see THE POLrTICS OF REGULATION (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980); Sam Peltzman, The Growth of Government 23 J.L &ECON. 209 (1980); George Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OFECON. & MOMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
30. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 45 (1982).
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industry.3' Investors did not seem to care much, however, and the stock
markets boomed during the 1920s. The 1929 Wall Street crash changed the
situation dramatically. Between September 1929 and July 1932, the value of
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) fell 83%, from $90
billion to $16 billion. The crash preceded a massive national depression, and
many blamed the problems of the economy on the activities of the financial
markets. 32 Ferdinand Pecora, counsel for the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, investigated practices on the stock exchanges and in the
banking and securities markets. These investigations, known as the Pecora
Hearings, lasted from January 1933 to July 1934.11
The hearings revealed extensive abuses in the stock markets. Many of the
abuses centered around price manipulation and the spreading of financial
misinformation. Sometimes speculators would secretly initiate heavy trading
in a particular stock to manipulate its price upward (a "ramp") or downward
(a "bear raid"). Manipulators often used "wash sales," no-risk sale-andrepurchase agreements, to generate artificial trading volume and buying
interest in stocks. Many brokers clubbed together in speculative pools where
they could trade on inside information under assumed names. Journalists were
bribed to write favorable news articles to boost particular stocks.' Bankers
also admitted to treating clients unequally, keeping highly secret "preferred
lists" of influential customers. In one such case, J.P. Morgan offered to sell
stock in the about-to-be-listed Alleghany Corporation to selected clients at a
price of $20 per share. The stock was already trading publicly on a "whenissued" basis at $37 per share, so the offer by Morgan was essentially a gift.
The "preferred list" of clients in this case included ex-President Coolidge,
General Pershing, and dozens of senior politicians and cabinet members
including at least one former Secretary of the Treasury, Senator William
Gibbs McAdoo."
The revelation of these practices gave rise to a huge public outcry and to
demands for wholesale reform of the regulatory structure of the financial
markets. The outcome was a series of new laws including the Securities Act

31. SUSAN M. PHM.Ln'S & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUB11C INTEREST 8 (1981).
32. ROBERT SOBEL, PANIC ON WALL STREET 351-52 (1968).
33. See FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY
CHANGERS (1939) (giving a first-hand account of the hearings).
34. See SELGMAN, supra note 30, at 17.

35. PECORA, supra note 33, at 27-31. The list also included former chairmen of both the Democratic
and the Republican National Committees, the ex-President of the American Bar Association, and most of
the highly prominent business leaders in the country.
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of 1933 (1933 Securities Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Exchange Act), and the Banking Act of 1935 (the Glass-Steagall Act). These
laws are the basis for the current regulatory structure in the United States. The
1933 Securities Act tackled abuses in the new-issue markets by requiring
issuers of securities to disclose relevant financial information so that would-be
investors could make more informed judgments about the stock on offer. The
purpose of the Act was, in the words of sponsor Senator Rayburn, to ensure
that the investor had "all information that is pertinent that would put him on
notice and on guard, and then let him beware. 36 On the other hand, the bill
would not, and was not intended to, "prevent anybody from putting his money
into rat holes or into highly speculative ventures if he sees fit to do so." 37 The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was given responsibility to enforce the
1933 Securities Act.
The 1934 Exchange Act was more extensive and tackled fraudulent
trading practices. The Act created the SEC to oversee trading on stock
exchanges and to administer the provisions of the new securities laws. The
1934 Exchange Act required that all brokers, dealers, and securities registered
on an exchange be licensed, and gave the licensing authority to the SEC. It
also gave the SEC considerable power over market participants, short-selling,
the use of customers' accounts held in custody, and over all forms of market
manipulation.
The SEC was created as a compromise between Congress and the
financial community. The Roosevelt administration originally wanted to give
extensive authority over securities markets to the FTC. The 1933 Securities
Act was the first step in that direction. The Wall Street community was
initially opposed to the idea of any supervisory regulation whatsoever.
Richard Whitney, President of the NYSE, claimed that it was a "perfect
institution. ' 38 However, opinion both in Washington and in the country at
large was running strongly against Wall Street. Pecora believed that the
NYSE was "in reality neither more nor less than a glorified gambling casino

36. THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S.
REGULATORY AGENCIES 2550 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973) [hereinafter THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY].
37. Id. at 2606.
38. PECORA, supra note 33, at 259.

1999]

SPAWNING THE

SEC

659

where the odds [are] heavily weighted against the eager outsiders."3 9 Senator
Raybum declared of the investment banking community that "these hired
officials of our great corporations ... these few men, proud, arrogant, and
blind, drove the country to financial ruin."' Seeing the writing on the wall,
the bankers mobilized to lobby for a new regulatory commission. They were
afraid of the power of the FTC and apparently believed that a separate
commission would be easier to influence. They lobbied hard, and with some
success, to appoint pro-business officials to the SEC. The first Chairman,
Joseph Kennedy, was a morally reprehensible Wall Street insider who had
himself been deeply implicated in some of the worst abuses on the NYSE."'
Despite this inauspicious start, however, the SEC quickly proved
remarkably effective in combating the sorts of abuse and market manipulation
that were characteristics of the pre-1929 period. Kennedy left after a year, and
in his wake, came a series of ideologically committed New Dealers, including
James M. Landis, William 0. Douglas, and Jerome Frank. They stressed
nonpartisanship, agency independence, and high moral standards as the
keystones of the SEC. Douglas boasted that in his day "no taint of unethical
conduct ever touched it, nor did partisan politics motivate it. Above all else,
the commission's performance was highly professional."42
The SEC was relatively inactive during the 1940s and 1950s. It was
deemed not to be important to the war effort, and the Eisenhower
administration cut its budget drastically. The SEC returned to public
prominence under Chairman William Carey during the "Great Society"
expansion in the 1960s. It took important steps in outlawing the practice of
insider trading in a series of landmark cases including Cady Roberts & Co.,'
and SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur Co.' The Williams Act of 1968 gave the SEC
the power to develop and administer rules on corporate takeovers. The agency
suffered a minor scandal in 1973 when Chairman Brad Cook was forced to
resign in the wake of allegations that he had given favorable treatment to a key
member of President Nixon's staff, but it soon won back its lost prestige.
Stanley Sporkin, Director of the Division of Enforcement, led what was

39. Id. at 263.
THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 2619.
41. Senator Edward Kennedy is reported to have said that the appointment of his father as Chairman
of the SEC was the worst appointment they ever made. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY

40.

PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 47 (1982).

42. Id. at 49 (quoting WuijAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 269 (1974)).
43. Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
44. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
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practically a crusade against market malpractice, and the agency won a
reputation as perhaps the strongest and most respected of all bureaucratic
agencies. Senator Proxmire said that "[iut's the strongest single unit that I
know in the federal government... the SEC has the reputation of being the
'
best agency-the most honest, most effective, with the most integrity."45
Some observers claim that it became too successful, because the relentless
pursuit of its primary mission of investor protection came at the expense of
other considerations, such as the promotion of national securities markets or
efficient capital formation.' Whatever the merits of this criticism, no one
disputes that "[b]y the end of the 1970s the SEC was the institution in
Washington that Wall Street and Corporate America feared most.

'47

V. THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE SECURITIES
AND INVESTMENTS BOARD, 1986
The British historically relied on a mixture of self-regulation and informal
guidance to police their stock markets. Until the 1980s, the United Kingdom's
domestic securities markets were small and insular, centered around the
London Stock Exchange and the surrounding "Square Mile" of the City of
London. Regulatory responsibilities were divided among the Bank of
England, the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the London
Stock Exchange itself. Close social ties between the regulators and the
regulated allowed for a high degree of informality in oversight, and also
facilitated what was, for centuries, a relatively effective form of selfregulation. The stock exchange motto, "My Word is My Bond," worked
reasonably well as a form of investor protection as long as the membership of
the exchange was limited to a small, socially cohesive group. 4
However, during the 1970s, an increasing amount of investment business
was being conducted outside the London Stock Exchange. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, a series of well-publicized scandals involving investment

45. KARMEL, supra note 41, at 70 (quoting Connie Bruck, Waning Daysfor the Zealot at the SEC,
AM. LAw., Nov. 1980, at 16).
46. See id. at 101-38.
47. DAVID A. VISE & STEVE CoIi, EAGLE ON THE STREET 9 (1991).
48. For an analysis of the social ties within the "City," see T. Lupton & C. Wilson, The Social
Background and Connections of Top Decision Makers, 27 MANCHESTER SCH. ECON. & Soc. STUD. 30
(1959); Michael Lisle-williams, Beyond the Market: The Survival of Family Capitalismin the English
Merchant Banks, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. 241, 241-71 (1984).
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firms outside the London Stock Exchange proved politically embarrassing.4 9
The Slater-Walker scandal, in 1975-77, was probably the most well-known of
these scandals. In 1981, Norton-Warburg, a supposedly "mainstream"
investment management group, went bankrupt, losing £4.5 million of client
funds. Its director was jailed on fraud charges. These and other cases rarely
involved large sums of money in absolute terms, but they often involved a few
individuals losing their entire life savings. As such, they made good headlines
and great copy.
The British Conservative Party was "not insensitive" to charges of
favoritism toward the City. It was particularly aware that its plans for massive
privatization and the creation of a "shareholders' democracy" would be
threatened if private investors lost confidence in the propriety of the markets.°
So, in July of 1981, the Minister of Trade commissioned Professor Jim Gower
to undertake a report on investor protection. Gower's report was the basis for
a White Paper in January 1985 and was passed into law as the Financial
Services Act (FSA) in November 1986.
Gower's report had stressed that the level of regulation and supervision
should not "seek to achieve the impossible task of protecting fools from their
own folly," but that it should be "no greater than is necessary to protect
reasonable people from being made fools of."'5' Unfortunately, the definition
of what should be "necessary" to protect people and what constituted
"reasonable" were not made clear. Moreover, Gower was not required to, nor
did he, consider the costs of regulation. Consequently, the FSA came down
on the "safe" side of heavy regulation. Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel
Lawson wrote that, "what eventually emerged was something far more
cumbersome and bureaucratic than I, or, I believe any of us in Government
had ever envisaged."52 The original bill consisted of 212 sections, 300 pages,

49. See JUuAN FRANKS & COLIN MAYER, RISK, REGULATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION: THE CASE
OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 75-85 (1989).
50. See JocK BRUCE-GARDYNE, MRS. THATCHER'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION 84, 85 (1984).
51. NIGEL LAWSON, THE VIEW FROM NO. 11: BRITAIN'S LONGEST-SERVING CABINET MEMBER
RECAuS THE TRIUMPHS AND DIsAPPoINTMENs OF THE THATCHER ERA 401 (1993). Note the sinilarity
of these sentiments to those underlying the 1933 and 1934 securities laws in the United States.
52. Id.
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and 600 amendments. It had been drafted by lawyers and bureaucrats, and
practitioners found it a nightmare even to understand, let alone implement."
The centerpiece of the FSA was the establishment of a new regulatory
structure. At the top was the Securities and Investment Board (SIB), a quasigovernmental body accountable directly to the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry. It consisted of both practitioners and bureaucrats. The SIB was
a constitutional novelty. It was financed by levies on the private financial
firms it regulated, but was not accountable either to them or Parliament.
Instead, the Director-General of the SIB was appointed by, and was
answerable to, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. It had the power
to make rules and award or revoke licenses for securities firms; but, unlike the
SEC, it had no independent power to fine or punish. The most it could do was
to bring cases of criminal wrongdoing to the attention of the Crown
Prosecution Service, which could then bring charges.
All investment firms had to be authorized and organized into one of a
number of "self-regulatory bodies" (SROs), which were, in turn, accountable
to the SIB.5 The FSA required any firm wishing to conduct financial services
to register with one of the SROs or with the SIB directly. The SROs were
responsible for drawing up and overseeing rules concerning business practices
in their respective fields. It was their responsibility to ensure compliance with
SRO-based rules and with those of the higher authority, the SIB. They did this
by requiring their registered firms to provide personnel to act as practitionerregulators. The SROs were manned chiefly by private employees on
secondment, and each individual firm was required to hire at least one inhouse "compliance officer." In short, the new system of "practitioner-based
regulation in a statutory framework"55 was comprehensive but cumbersome.
The costs of the new structure were to be born by the industry, most directly
by the payment of fees to the SROs.

53. Interview with Fabio P. Savoldelli, Fund Manager at Bank of Tokyo International, London, in
London, England (July 1993). See C. Makin, First Big Bang, Now Big Brother, INsTrrUtioNAL INVESTOR,
May 1988, at 58-67 (showing how the industry viewed the new regime).
54. Initially there were five SROs. The Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO)
represented all of the larger and some of the smaller, but more prestigious fund managers. The Association
of Futures Brokers and Dealers (AFBD) represented futures brokers and dealers. The Financial
Intermediaries, Managers, and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA) represented the small operators,
typically those serving retail clients. The Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization
(LAUTRO) represented the insurers and unit trusts, the British equivalent of mutual funds.
55. This phrase was given to me by James Ekins, Director, IMRO.
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The unusual hybrid nature of the SIB owes much to the uneasy
compromise with which it was born. On the one hand, Gower was known to
favor a strong and central regulator modeled along the lines of America's
SEC. On the other hand, the Conservative Government was known to be
ideologically hostile to any extension of government that could be avoided:
certainly the creation of a large bureaucratic agency was unlikely to be
welcomed by the Thatcherites. The City was generally thought to prefer selfregulation where possible, however, there is also evidence that some in the
City were in favor of a greater degree of regulatory oversight. "The
Governor's Group," a think-tank, appointed by the Governor of the Bank of
England and consisting of ten prominent City figures, including London Stock
Exchange Chief Nicholas Goodison, were asked to look into the feasibility of
continued self-regulation. Reportedly, they concluded that self-regulation
could work, but only with beefed-up statutory underpinnings. A minority even
suggested that the Bank of England (Bank) take over the role of stock market
regulation.56
The Bank, however, was ambivalent. It was reluctant to see the
establishment of an SEC-type body that would clearly undercut its
preeminence as the chief overseer of London's financial markets.57 On the
other hand, the Bank was reeling under criticism from its failure to prevent the
collapse of Johnson-Matthey Bank. An example of the type of rhetoric
employed against the Bank is provided by the following Parliamentary
exchange. Labour Party Member of Parliament (MP) Mr. Brian Sedgemore
argued that the Johnson-Matthey banking scandal arose from "the wanton and
negligent behaviour of [Governor of the Bank of England] Mr. Robin LeighPemberton.... How can anyone trust a system of supervision organized by
that appalling deadbeat?" To this, Nigel Lawson, Conservative Chancellor of
the Exchequer, replied: "To call Mr. Sedgemore a pest would be an insult to
pests;" in turn prompting Sedgemore to call Lawson a "sniveling little git." S
Many Bank officials believed that future collapses and scandals were
inevitable and that, as bankers, they did not necessarily have the expertise to
prevent such problems from occurring in securities markets. A new regulatory
body with specific responsibility for oversight, but deliberately kept less

56. MARGARET REID, ALL-CHANGE INTHE CITY 246 (1988).
57. ANTHONY HILTON, CITY WITHIN A STATE: A PORTRAIT OF BRrfAIN'S FINANCIAL WORLD 31

(1988).
58. INSTITUTONAL INVESTOR, June 1986 (quoting a Parliamentary Debate, Dec. 17, 1985). A "git"
is a relatively modem British term of abuse approximately equivalent to the American expression "jerk."
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powerful than the Bank, could be an ideal way to divert political criticism
from the Bank ahead without compromising its position. With these issues in
mind, the Bank's Governor reportedly accepted the idea of the SIB; and,
calling in turn on the heads of all of the major banks, he "ordered the City to
do likewise."5 9
Needless to say, financial firms complained bitterly about the costs of
these new rules. The real losers of the FSA were the unscrupulous or the
incompetent, and they faced difficulties in mobilizing politically. But all firms
were potentially hurt, not just with the direct costs of compliance, but in terms
of lost business, reduced competition, and stifled innovation as the onerous
new requirements scared away new participants, especially foreign ones.
David Lomax, economic advisor to National Westminster Bank, wrote that
"one of the main threats to the future health of the financial services industry
in the UK is that of excessive or inappropriate legislation."' He calculated
that the direct costs to the City of the Financial Services Act were in the order
of £100 million.6' Charles Goodhart, of the London School of Economics,
wrote that the "overregulation" was in response to "a series of minor but well' Arguing that since the regulators did
publicised scandals."62
not have to bear
the burden of costs, but did have to face political flak in the event of scandals,
the lengthy and detailed SIB rule book "seems not to have left reasonable
investor protection at a minimum." 63 Moreover, there was little concern with
limiting the costs of regulation. Indeed, costs had been deliberately excluded
from Gower' s terms of reference."
Such apparent disregard for London's competitive position, or for the
preferences of the biggest brokers and investors, scarcely accords with the
explanation of Big Bang that stresses that competition was the driving force
for change. It could, perhaps, be objected that there is little hard evidence that
London, as a financial center, suffered from the terms of the FSA. Ten years
later, it is still the preeminent financial center in Europe. On the other hand,
as Grilli argues, given the "thick externalities" associated with being a

59. HILTON, supra note 57, at 32.
60. DAVID F. LOMAX, LONDON MARKErS AFrER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 202-37 (1989).

61. Id.at 198.
62. C.A.E. GOODHART, THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 450 (1995).

63. Id.at 451.
64. Charles Goodhart, The Economics of Regulation, in FINANCIAL
OVERREGULATION? 15, 21 (Arthur Seldon ed., 1988).
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financial center, it is possible that London maintained its preeminent
65
international role not because of but in spite of the terms of the FSA.
A more telling counter-argument is that, since the FSA was passed, it has
been continuously watered down in the face of ongoing attacks from the City.
Most telling is the replacement of the first head of the SIB, Sir Kenneth
Berrill, with David Walker. Berrill, described by Nigel Lawson as "somewhat
peripatetic," was held responsible for the SIB's overly bureaucratic
approach.' He was not reappointed in 1988. David Gowland writes that he
"was effectively sacked."67 His replacement, David Walker of the Bank of
England, was a popular City choice thought to herald "a move to a less
onerous system of regulation."' According to Lawson, "While the regulatory
system ushered in by the FSA still suffers from a number of its early defects,
there has been a considerable improvement and simplification since the
Government and the Bank replaced Berrill as SIB chairman in 1988 with the
Bank's David Walker."'69 The trend of appointing chief regulators more
sympathetic to the needs of large City institutions continued when Walker was
replaced by Andrew Large, who had a City background as a practitioner in the
Euromarkets.
Official pronouncements from the regulators themselves, that the FSA was
backfiring on the City, provided further evidence that the original FSA went
too far in the direction of investor protection. As expected, the regulatory
authority most closely charged with ensuring the profitability of the City, the
Bank, was most vociferous in its cost-consciousness. The Governor remarked
in 1989:
I am very conscious of the costs that have been, and continue
to be, involved in regulation and therefore welcome not only
the SIB's simplified rulebook but also the Secretary of State's
acknowledgment of these costs and his intention to amend
legislation accordingly. We shall need to remain vigilant in
striking the balance between the protection of investors and
the costs imposed on the activities of financial firms if

65. See Vittorio Grilli, Europe 1992: Issues and Prospectsfor FinancialMarkets, ECON. POL'Y, Oct.
9, 1989, at 394.
66. LAWSON, supra note 51, at 399.
67. DAVID GOWLAND, REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKErS iN THE 1990s 92 (1990).
68. Id.
69. LAWSON, supranote 51, at 402.
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London's competitiveness is not to be eroded and "regulatory
arbitrage".., is not to become a criterion in decisions on
70
where to conduct business.
In other words, the producers of financial services either opposed the
passage of the FSA in its current form and are still struggling to modify its
terms; or in the case of the crooks that the FSA was designed to thwart, they
were unable to lobby. There is little evidence that big customers took sides
at first. Later on, they too threw their weight behind the efforts of the
intermediaries to rewrite the FSA to allow far greater freedom of action in
trades between professionals.7 This leaves only the government or small
customers as potential supporters of the FSA. Clearly, the latter were the
intended beneficiaries, but, surprisingly, there does not appear to have been
any large or well-coordinated campaign by small investors to get more
protection. 2 Pressure from small investors appears to have worked indirectly,
if at all. Is this, then, a case of political entrepreneurship on behalf of the
Thatcher government? This certainly seems to be part of the explanation. We
have seen that they were anxious to avoid the stigma of being "soft on the
City," and it is significant that the City, too, recognized the political dangers.
The big firms waited until after the 1987 election before launching their big
lobbying campaign against the FSA.73 Yet this is not the whole story. As seen
from Lawson's comments above, the original FSA did not meet with
Conservative approval, and its history has been one of constant amendment.
Another part of the explanation, then, must be that the drafters of the Bill, who
were Treasury bureaucrats and lawyers, were insulated from the lobbying
efforts of the City and of the ruling party, and drafted an act with reference
exclusively to prudential problems as they perceived them. Unfortunately,
their perceptions did not necessarily mirror the reality of such problems. It
was in this insulated form that the FSA went before Parliament, and it has
been amended to better suit the larger investors ever since.
The FSA has not ended fraud in the City, and in fact appears to have done
a particularly bad job of protecting smaller investors. Both BCCI and the
Maxwell pension fund scandals, in which small retail savers and pension fund

70. Monetary Policy, Equity Markets and the City's Infrastructure,29 BANK ENG. Q. BULL 529, 530
(1989).
71. Interview with Nils Taube, Partner, Kitcat and Aitkins (May 11, 1990).
72. See GOODHART, supra note 62, at 433-34.

73. REID, supra note 56, at 251.
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holders were the main victims, were precisely the sorts of things the FSA tried
to prevent. The Maxwell scandal is particularly interesting: the whole
premise of the FSA was investor protection, with the assumption that the
potential crook is always the intermediary. The FSA did not envisage that the
investor himself would be dishonest, and there were no rules allowing for this
contingency. It was through this loophole that Robert Maxwell managed to
squeeze himself."' The BCCI scandal appears to have been an abject failure
of oversight on behalf of the Bank. An extremely cynical explanation for the
failure of oversight in the BCCI case is that regulators do not have the
resources to oversee more than a small proportion of their mandate and must
select those on whom to focus their attention. Not surprisingly, they
concentrate mostly on intermediaries who deal with domestic clients. They
are less concerned politically if foreign investors, even under their
jurisdiction, are being ripped off. This may explain the impunity with which
investment managers in London routinely broke the most important rules of
the FSA and the Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO)."
BCCI may provide an example of this phenomenon."'
The inability of the new structure to protect small investors appeared to
be so endemic that in 1993 the Treasury commissioned bureaucrat Sir Kenneth
Clucas to investigate retail investor protection. His recommendation was that
the SIB establish a new SRO specifically for retail investors. The new SRO
would comprise a merger of LAURTRO, FIMBRA, and those parts of IMRO

74. Interview with James Ekins, Director, IMRO in London, England (July 10, 1992).
75. In this vein it is instructive to consider two of the most spectacular incidents of financial
dishonesty in recent times: first, the collapse of Barings Bank due to huge losses on unauthorized futures
trades in Singapore in 1994; and second, the revelation in 1995 that Daiwa Bank's American subsidiary
lost over $I billion in unauthorized futures trades in New York. Both were not just the result of a financial
firm's overseas subsidiary acting illegally, but the local regulators completely overlooking the problem, even
though it was legally their responsibility. It is hard to imagine that an American bank in New York could
cover up millions of dollars worth of losses for over eleven years, as Daiwa was able to do. See Keith
Bradsher, U.S. Concedes Lax Response in Daiwa Case: Greenspan Says the Fed Studies Tougher Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1995, at DI.
76. Certainly this was the view of Labour MPs such as Roy Hattersley, who pointed out that the
British victims of the BCCI collapse were concentrated among the South Asian immigrant populations who
were chiefly of Pakistan origin in inner cities such as Birmingham, and who had turned to BCCI because
of its greater concern for immigrants' business. He argued, in effect, that racism or at least a studied
indifference toward the well being of this section of the population was behind the Bank's disregard of
warning signs about BCCI's affairs. See Neil Buckley, Tragedyfor Asian Traders, FIN. TMES, July 8,
1991.
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and the new Securities and Futures Association (SFA)" which represented
private clients. The result was the proposal of a Personal Investment
Authority (PIA) in 1992 with intense criticism from the big banks and life
7
insurers. 1
Even this did little to assuage public complaints that small investors and
savers were not adequately protected by the new regime. The most recent
source of criticism came from a SIB report on personal pensions, a £4 billion
industry, that concluded that in over one and a half million cases, investors
were wrongly advised by firms. The SIB came under criticism from consumer
groups, Trade Unions, and Labour MPs for its failure both to protect
individuals or adequately to punish corporate wrong-doers. Alistair Darling,
Labour's City spokesman, was reported as saying that "[tihe regulators must
...act for the public good."'79
The continued failure of the new regulatory regime adequately to
represent small investors was demonstrated by the founding of a new pressure
group, The Guild of Shareholders, in 1995. Its founder was a former
Conservative MP, Tom Benyon; and its goal was to ensure better
representation for small investors on company boards. The last straw had
been a fight during the 1995 British Gas annual meeting, when private
shareholders had attempted to block what many believed to be the excessive
new pay package for Chief Executive Cedric Brown. The attempt had been
beaten by the proxy votes of institutional investors. According to Benyon,
"[t]he Guild is banding private shareholders together in a lobby big enough to
stop them [from] being pushed around."'
In contrast to the failure of the regulatory authorities effectively to oversee
the retail markets, British regulators have been extremely conscientious in
their attempts to stamp out financial fraud where big institutional investors
and liquidity traders rather than small savers are the real victims.

77. The SFA was created by the merger of the securities and futures regulators in 1992, themselves
creations of mergers from the original SROs.
78. Self-Regulation's Last Stand?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1992, at 77.
79. Robert Miller, SIB Accused of Weak Stance in Pension Scandal, TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at 23.
80. Colin Narbrough, Private Shareholders Promised More Clout, TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at 36.
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VI. JAPAN: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, 1991

Modern Japanese financial regulations were drawn up by the Allied
occupation forces (SCAP) in 1946 and were closely modeled on existing U.S.
law." The Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) of 1947 governed the issuance
and trading of stocks and bonds. The law closely followed U.S. practice on
many points. Most importantly, Article 65 copied the Glass-Stegall Act's
separation of investment and commercial banking and established the
Securities Commission for the Supervision of Securities Business as a direct
equivalent agency to the SEC. The Japanese commission, like its American
counterpart, was independent of other agencies or political control and was
entrusted with the administration of the 1947 law. Although both the United
States and Japan began post-war life with almost identical financial
regulations on paper, securities markets in the two countries were soon to
develop along very different trajectories. The break came in 1952 with the
"Reverse Course" of occupation policy in Japan. SCAP, worried by the
advent of the Cold War and anxious both to prevent Communist or Socialist
influence from gaining ground in Japan, and to build Japan's economic
strength as quickly as possible, had begun to draw back from the "New Deal"
progressivism of its earlier reforms. This left Japanese bureaucrats quietly but
firmly to reestablish the control over economic life that they held before
World War H. One of the first causalities of the Reverse Course was the
Securities Commission. It was abolished by the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
in 1952 and replaced with an internal advisory council to the Securities
Bureau, which had no independent powers. The MOF arranged the abolition
because it wanted to regain control over all aspects of financial regulation. 2
At the same time, the MOF abolished various other articles designed to
establish American standards of business practice. Among those scrapped was
Article 189, an equivalent of the SEC's Rule 16(b) which constrains "shortswing trading" and therefore inhibits the practice of insider trading.
The divergence between Japanese and American financial regulation grew
more and more stark over the next thirty years. One of the most significant
areas of difference involved supervision. In the United States, regulatory
authority was fragmented among many different agencies, and investor

81. See ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST INJAPAN (1970).
82. See T.F.M. ADAMS & IwAO HOSH,

A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW JAPAN 52 (1972).
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protection was provided by an agency, the SEC, which had no divided
loyalties and plenty of power to do its job. The result was that the SEC did a
reasonably good job of protecting investors from unscrupulous brokers within
the securities industry. In Japan, regulatory authority was highly centralized
within the MOF, which was responsible for both promoting the interests of the
securities industry and for ensuring investor protection. When the two goals
came into conflict, the MOF would almost invariably side with the brokers.
The Securities Bureau was so partisan that many Japanese bankers referred to
it as "the Toranomon branch of Nomura Securities." 3 The resulting Japanese
securities markets were so rife with dubious practices that the Tokyo Stock
Exchange acquired the nickname "insaidatengoku" or insiders' paradise."
This state of affairs did not seem to trouble politicians, bureaucrats, or the
general public. The "Bubble Economy" of the mid to late 1980s saw prices
on the Tokyo stock market soar, and Japanese investors were apparently happy
to overlook abuses by brokers as long as everyone was making money.
However, in the late 1980s, a series of financial scandals shook the country
and changed public attitudes dramatically.
In 1987, Tateho Chemical Company engaged in highly speculative bond
futures trading and incurred losses of over ¥23 billion. 5 The Tateho's main
bank, Hanshin Sogo, sold its entire holding of Tateho stock the day before the
losses were made public and the share price collapsed. This clear abuse of
privileged information provoked a public outcry, but the Osaka Stock
Exchange was unable to establish that Hanshin had broken any rules.86
In 1988, the Recruit Company admitted that it had been bribing politicians
by giving them cheap shares in an unlisted subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos. When
the subsidiary was listed, the shares immediately and predictably rose in value.
The list of those who had received these shares included the private secretaries

83. At the bottom of this symbiotic relationship was the amakudari system, whereby Japanese
bureaucrats would retire to take up lucrative private sector jobs. MOF officials, in common with most
Japanese bureaucrats, were poorly paid and the prospect of retirement to a wealthy securities firm was an
attractive one: the regulators thus had strong personal incentives not to rock the boat by investigating those

same firms.
84. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUNSHA, INSAIDA TENGOKU: KENSHOO NIHON KABUSHIKI SHUO [INSIDER'S

PARADISE: THE JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS] (1988) (documenting the widespread practice of insider
trading in Japan).
85. In the 1980s, most Japanese corporations were finding that speculation in the financial markets
a process known as zaiteku, or financial engineering, was often more profitable than their core businesses.
86. See GURUPu NE,INSADA TORIHIKI NO NAIMUKU [INSIDE INFORMATION ON INSIDER TRADING]

22-38 (1988).
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Takeshita Noburu, who resigned over the affair, and Minister of Finance
Miyazawa Kiichi.17
In 1991, the four biggest Japanese securities companies, Nomura, Daiwa,
Nikko, and Yamaichi, admitted that during the 1980s they gave illegal
guarantees of a set rate of return on funds entrusted to them by favored
clients." When the Tokyo stock market crashed in 1990,1 the brokers had
made good on their guarantee by compensating their preferred clients, while
less favored investors lost fortunes. Suspicions grew that the MOF had been
aware of this morally dubious practice but had done little to prevent it90 The
brokers' unsavory reputation was not helped when, at around the same time,
Nomura admitted that it had been lending money to a Yakuza (gangster) boss
to help him manipulate the share price of Tokyu Railway Corporation. The
lost compensation scandal provoked such an intense barrage of criticism that
it served as the catalyst for far-reaching reforms of the Japanese regulatory
structure for financial markets.
The scandals of 1991 created an uproar in Japan. The most shocking
aspect of the affair for many was the evidence that the MOF had known all
along about the various abuses, but had done nothing to prevent them.9'
Indeed, it was only when the National Tax Agency acted that the scandal
broke at all. The Securities Bureau was perceived as having no role in
exposing the scandal. According to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun:
The scandals were generated by a combination of factors-the
absence of competition (which leads to excessive profits),
legal laxity against fraudulent trading, ambiguous rules and
a poor surveillance system. Common to these factors is an
administrative policy that gives top priority to protecting and
fostering the industry in a close symbiotic relationship
between bureaucrats and business. Given such a state of

87. See BRIAN READIo, JAPAN: THE COMtNO COLLAPSE 263-67 (1992); ASAHI SHIMBUN,
TAKESHITA SEIKEN NO HOKAI: RIKURUTO JIKEN TO SEui KAIKAKU [THE FALL OF THE TAKESHiTA
ADMINISTRATION: POLITICAL REFORM AND THE RECRUrr INCIDENT] (1989).
88. OKUMURA HIROSHI SHOKEN SUKANDARU [STOCK SCANDAL] (1993) (covering the scandal); see
also CHRisTOPHER WOOD, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE 118-26 (1992).

89. The Nikkei 225 index fell 39% during 1990.
90. Technically it was not actually illegal for a broker to compensate some clients but not others for
losses, although this practice did breach an MOF directive of 1989. It was, however, illegal to guarantee
a set rate of return on an investment fund.
91. Steven R Wiesman, OversightPlanLoses in Japan,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1991, at L35.
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affairs, the only recommendation should be for a complete
separation of a watchdog body from bureaucraticcontrol
.... [Which] should be given as wide-ranging authority as
possible.1
The scandal also drew attention to the low priority that the MOF put on
market oversight. The entire securities industry was monitored for fairness by
only thirty or so staff from the Securities Bureau.93 The Tokyo Stock
Exchange had around thirty more staff in its surveillance division, while the
other self-regulatory organization, the Japan Securities Dealers Association,
had no monitoring function.9 4 This lack of resources would have made it very
difficult for the authorities adequately to police the markets even if they were
genuinely committed to doing so-a commitment which many people doubted
in any case.
By July 1991, public uproar over the scandal was so great that the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) felt compelled to act. Prime Minister Toshiki
Kaifu formed a government advisory panel to review the system of regulatory
reform including the possibility of establishing a financial watchdog similar
to the SEC. This panel, the Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform
(Reform Commission), contained nine members drawn from business, labor,
and academic circles. Eiji Suzuki was appointed Chairman. He was a former
chairman of the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations (Keidanren)and
was known to favor the creation of an independent, SEC-style agency. Also
on the Reform Commission were union leaders Eikichi and Ashida, who were
both also enthusiastic proponents of radical change in the way the markets
were policed. Again, both were known to favor an independent, SEC-type
regulatory agency.
The senior ranks of the LDP supported the initiative to create an
independent agency to monitor the securities industry. In July 1991, LDP
Secretary-General Obuchi Keizo said that such a body should be considered
as part of an effort to prevent the recurrence of the compensation scandal.
"Japan's political and administrative systems must be changed so that they can
be accepted by the international community," Keizo told a meeting of the
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LDP.95 Nishioka Takeo, Chairman of the LDP's Executive Council, referred
to the scandal and said that "self-responsibility" must be respected. Given
Japan's status as the second-largest economic power, Japanese business should
be conducted in accordance with "common rules" within the international
community. In addition, "establishing conditions for fair competition in a
free-market economy is the responsibility of politicians. '"
Indeed, most of the debate over the new agency centered on how similar
to the SEC the Japanese version should be. Most people outside the securities
industry and the MOF strongly favored an American-style agency. 7 The heads
of all of the major business organizations supported this idea. These
supporters included Suzuki of Keidanren; Hayami Masaru, Chairman of the
Japan Association of Corporate Executives; and Nagano Takeshi of Nikkeiren,
the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations.98 The idea also had support
from the Japanese Trade Union Confederation and the Democratic Socialist
Party. Bank of Japan advisor Suzuki Yukio wrote that "Japan does not act
promptly enough to prevent shady stock market transactions ....What Japan
needs is a strict regulatory body like the US Securities and Exchange
Commission.""
Missing from the debates about the new agency were the voices of the
powerful securities companies, especially the "Big Four." Their reluctance to
take too prominent a position was entirely understandable given the
companies' extreme unpopularity and the intense scrutiny to which they were
then subject. As new revelations about their nefarious activities emerged,
seemingly daily, they could do little more than hunker down and wait for the
storm of protest to subside. A senior official at one Big Four company
explained that "of course the securities companies hated the new regulations.
We didn't like the SESC... but at the time we had no influence because of the
scandals.""
The MOF opposed the creation of a new agency. This position had the
solid support of Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, who was extremely
sympathetic to the Ministry. He said, "[t]he securities industry is not so
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troubled as to need a watchdog like the SEC"'' and later claimed that the
creation of the agency entailed "much pain" to the Ministry."°2 The staff of the
Reform Commission, drawn from the ranks of the MOF itself, also helped the
MOF's cause. The director of staff for the Commission, Masujima Toshiyuki,
was a senior official in the MOF's Management and Coordination Agency.
What resulted was a battle between the reformers on the Commission, who
wanted real change, and the MOF staff on the Commission, who were
determined not to give away any more power than they had to. l"3 Secret
meetings with the Finance Minister, impossible deadlines, and bureaucratic
pressures were some of the tools used by the MOF to water down the most farreaching proposals.° 4
The decisive event in the MOF's defense of its turf came in September
1991. Commission Chairman Suzuki stated at a public news conference that
he intended to make the new watchdog agency independent of the MOF.
Shortly afterward, Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro met first with Suzuki
and then, in secret, with staff director Masujima. After that meeting,
Masujima began aggressively to argue against the idea of an independent body
and is quoted as saying that "[a]ny new organization has to be in harmony with
the existing structure. '' "es His arguments began to sway the members of the
Commission, who were already under pressure to meet the September 13th
deadline to make the final report to Prime Minister Kaifu.
By early September, all the Reform Commission members except the two
union leaders had agreed to a compromise solution whereby the agency would
be nominally autonomous but operated under the auspices of the MOF. To
achieve compromise, Magara and Ashida agreed to allow the agency to
operate within the MOF only if it had the twin powers to order a stop to
securities laws violations and to punish offenders unilaterally. The other
members of the Commission agreed to this compromise, and the two
provisions appeared on the draft given to Commission members for review on
September 11th. When the final draft appeared before the Council for the
vote, however, the two provisions were gone, obviously removed by the MOF
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staff. There was no time to make further amendments, and the draft presented
to the Prime Minister was, therefore, considerably weakened even from the
watered down compromise agreed by the Commission. Masujima admitted
that his staff had removed the provisions, claiming that "[tlhere was such
limited time that, in the end, the most persuasive line had to be included in the
06
report."1
The Reform Commission reported back in September 1991 with a report
on Basic Measures to Rectify Unfair Securities and Financial Dealings. It
addressed four separate matters. First, it reviewed current administrative
practices and explored measures to ensure greater transparency. Second, it
looked to strengthen the functions of the industry's self-regulatory bodies.
Third, it examined the way surveillance and inspection should be carried out.
Finally, it established the principle of self-responsibility for investors. 0 7 In
connection with the third point, it recommended the creation of an
independent watchdog within the MOF and the concomitant reorganization of
the various inspection agencies already existing within the Ministry. °0
Based on these recommendations, the MOF set up a special panel to study
the securities and financial monitoring system "canvassing views from many
sectors and considering the matter in the widest perspective" as they
themselves claimed. 109 This included visits by the MOF to the SEC in order
to better understand how the Americans dealt with financial irregularities."'
The result was a bill partially to amend the SEL, drafted in February 1992.
The bill was approved by the Diet in May 1992 with implementation set for
July 20, 1992.
The SESC is composed of a chairman and two commissioners, who are
appointed to three-year terms by the Minister of Finance, subject to approval
by the Diet."' Except under specific exceptional circumstances, their status
is guaranteed and they cannot be discharged. The first Chairman, Mizuhara
Toshihiro, came from a career in the Public Prosecutor's Office. It was a
significant and deliberate decision to appoint someone outside the MOF as the
first chairman. Of the two commissioners one, Narita Masamichi, came from
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a career at NHK, the Japanese public television company, where he had been
Chief Commentator. The other commissioner, Mihara Hidetaka, was another
bureaucrat; he was the former Secretary-General of the Board of Audit. As of
1992, there were 202 staff, 84 in Tokyo and 118 in regional offices, although
around half of the regional staff were assigned to the monitoring the Tokyo
Stock Exchange.
The powers of the SESC are not nearly as great as those of the SEC. It
can investigate suspicious trading, but has few independent powers beyond
those to recommend action to the MOF or the Public Prosecutor's Office.
Unlike the SEC, the SESC has no independent power to penalize market
participants for abuses of laws nor does it have subpoena power when it is
conducting investigations or enforcement actions. The Inspection division is
authorized to probe into suspicious cases, but does not have the right to bring
prosecutions. Instead, it may make accusations of suspected crimes to the
Public Prosecutor's Office, which retains the right to bring cases to court. It
may obtain a court order to search target premises and seize evidence. The
SESC may recommend that the Minister of Finance take disciplinary action
against a company it suspects of wrongdoing, and the Minister is obligated to
respect this recommendation and report back to the SESC on any disciplinary
actions taken. It can, moreover, make policy recommendations to the Minister.
In Japan, the initial response to the SESC was frustration that the MOF
had prevented more radical reform. Magara Eikichi stated that "there is no
question the Finance Ministry used its power, officially and unofficially, to
make sure this new body was under its influence."' " 2 The point was not lost
on the Japanese press or public: "It is sad to admit that Japan is a country by
bureaucrats, of bureaucrats, and for bureaucrats," stated the Yomiuri
Shimbun."3 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun argued that "[a]ll through this mess
the Finance Ministry has done nothing more than seek to defend itself. There
are no signs that ministry officials feel responsibility for the scandals which
were invited in part by their close relations with securities firms."4 According
to Kyoto University Economics Professor Sawa Takemitsu, "the Ministry of
Finance ended up with what they wanted. In fact, the whole interdependence

112. Sterngold, supra note 104, at D3.
113. Id.
114. Id.

1999]

SPAWNING THE SEC

677

of the Government Bureaucracy and the securities industry will end up even
5
stronger than it was before.""
However, this pessimism now looks overstated. The criticisms that the
SESC is neither as powerful nor as independent as the SEC are disputed by the
Commission itself. According to Secretary-General of the Executive Bureau,
Ishizaka Masami:
Some critics contend, erroneously, that the SESC of Japan has
little power, but it, in effect, has as much criminal
investigative powers as the SEC has. For example, Japan's
Commission, if armed with a court warrant, can enter the
premise of a suspect and conduct compulsory investigation.
In this sense, I have the feeling that Japan's Commission,
legally speaking, has stronger power than its US counterpart.
The SEC has no power to conduct compulsory investigations,
subpoena
such as the power to seize evidence. It can only
6
evidence."
submit
to
witnesses or order them
Subsequently, there has been much comment on how short-staffed the
Agency is relative to its American counterpart. The observation that its staff
numbers compared poorly to the 2600-odd staff of the SEC became so
pervasive that SESC officials took to rebutting it formally. Ishizaka Masami,
Secretary-General of the Executive Bureau, wrote that:
Some complain that with a ratio of 200 to 2,600, Japan's
commission cannot hold a candle to the SEC. However, the
comparison these critics make is based on a wrong number.
As the number of staffs assigned to the Enforcement Division
of the SEC is 800, not 2,600, the number of staffs of Japan's
commission should be compared with 800 .... However the
800 enforcement officers of the SEC have to keep watch over
12,000 registered securities companies. By contrast, Japan's
commission has only 200-odd licensed securities companies
to ride herd on. When the two are compared in this light, our
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Commission is not so underhanded as these critics would
7
have us believe."
Many critics were deeply unhappy that the MOF had apparently managed
to retain control over the SESC. Significantly, the staff of the SESC go to
considerable pains to stress the degree of independence they enjoy from the
MOF and the securities industry. They cite the fact that all three
commissioners were deliberately chosen for their lack of ties to either the
ministry or the securities industry. Chairman Mizuhara bluntly stated, "[w]e
will act independently of the MOF.. ' " 8 Secretary-General Ishikaza Masami
claims that "we are not at all controlled by the finance ministry ... each
institution has its own responsibilities.""' 9 In interviews, staffers usually stress
the fact of their independence, often citing the staff drawn from the tax agency
as evidence of their commitment to objective and politically neutral law
enforcement.
The performance of the SESC provides grounds for thinking that it takes
its new role seriously. The agency disputes claims that it is too timid and
weak and points to a growing series of successes in identifying and rooting out
undesirable market practices. Since inauguration the SESC has launched a
significant number of investigations. The Commission inspected 170 cases of
irregular share-price movements in 1992-93 and 217 in 1993-94. In four of
these cases, the inspections resulted in the SESC bringing accusations to the
Public Prosecutor's Office which resulted in court action and prosecutions. 2 °
In more than one case, the agency secured evidence by use of massive "dawn
raids" on the offices of the suspects. The success of the raids in gathering
evidence is cited as proof of the SESC's effectiveness. "In reality, we
have . . . much the same power as the American SEC," remarked Director
Nakai Sei in relation to the Nihon Unisys case.' There is, moreover, ample
evidence that market participants believe the SESC is making a significant
difference in the way that Japan's financial markets are regulated. A
managing director of a Japanese Investment Trust commented that "[tihe
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Japanese stock market has been unclear to foreign investors because of
speculative price movements. The commission's activities will keep the
market clean."' 2 2 The sentiment was echoed, albeit more cautiously, by the
President of Fidelity Investments Japan, who remarked of the successful raids
during the Nihon Unisys investigation that "it's a big step forward... but the
Commission's still got a long way to go."'"
In summary, the creation of the SESC is clear evidence that the Japanese
have moved decisively, if incompletely, toward a more American style of
financial regulation. The Japanese have accepted the principle, established in
the United States in 1933-34, that fair markets are likely to be healthier and,
therefore, of more value to society, than unfair ones. To that end, it is vital for
the regulatory authorities to appear to be policing the markets in a vigorous
and evenhanded fashion. This principle requires a greater degree of distance
between regulators and regulated than Japanese bureaucrats had previously
deemed desirable, and it also requires the application of public, formal
sanctions where necessary. This represents a change from the previous belief
that administrative guidance was all that was necessary to keep the markets
functioning. It remains true, despite what the more enthusiastic SESC
spokesmen might argue, that the SESC is not the all-powerful body that the
SEC is, nor is it as politically independent. Nonetheless, this is clearly an area
in which the Japanese have consciously emulated U.S. regulatory practices.
The reasons for doing so were mixed. The demand for reform was primarily
domestic, but the American model clearly influenced the debate within Japan.
The SEC set a standard against which the Japanese measured their new
agency. Moreover, the Japanese government was also prompted to act in part
out of fear that foreign investors would shun a market which was as unfair and
"rigged" as Tokyo appeared to be in the late 1980s.
VII. GERMANY: THE SUPERVISORY OFFICE
FOR SECURITIES DEALING, 1994
Germany has a system of universal banking, which means that securities
trading has never been considered a separate concern for regulators. The
banking industry generally is exempt from antitrust law (Kartellgesetz) but is
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supervised by the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) and the Federal
Supervisory Office for Credit Institutions (Bundessamtfurdas Kreditwesen).
Historically, securities markets were much less important than bank lending
as a source of corporate funds, although this situation began to change in the
late 1980s. Each of the eight stock exchanges was responsible for ensuring
fair play, which they did through a series of voluntary codes and minimal
supervision. In 1993, Frankfurt had an insider trading commission of only six
people.' 24
In July 1994, the German parliament passed the Financial Markets
Promotion Act (Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz)(FMPA) in an attempt to
bolster the status of Germany as a major international financial center, a
concept known asfinanzplatz Deutschland, and also to implement a number
of European Community (EC) directives, including the requirement to ban
insider trading. The FMPA established a new Federal Supervisory Office for
Securities Dealing, the Bundesaufsichtsamtfurden Wertpapierhandel,which
was to be responsible for policing German securities markets and was to work
in conjunction with the eight individual stock exchanges and the state
governments. The FMPA also banned insider trading, for the first time in
German history, and required companies to disclose any information that
might affect stock or bond prices.
The German government appears to have taken this action under pressure
from both domestic and international sources. Domestically, public opinion
was growing less tolerant of insider trading; and in 1990s, Germany was
shaken by a series of insider trading scandals. In 1991, the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange uncovered an insider-dealing ring of about thirty brokers. In 1992,
Deutsche Bank sacked a number of its staff for breaching internal rules
prohibiting insider trading."z A much more serious scandal broke in 1993.
Franz Steinkuhler was the head of IG Metall, a powerful engineering trade
union with 3.5 million members." 6 Steinkuhler sat on the supervisory board
of Daimler-Benz, and accordingly had access to confidential information. In
March 1993, after a board meeting at Daimler-Benz, he bought large numbers
of shares in a Daimler-owned company, Mercedes Holding Company (MAH).
In April, Dainler announced that it was dissolving MAH and swapping the
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shares one-for-one with Daimler stock. The share price of MAH rose sharply,
and Steinkuhler made a profit of over DM 100,000. In May, Stern magazine
publicized his dealings, prompting a public outcry and demands for reform.
The IG Metall scandal was a particular embarrassment for the government
because it came at a time when Germany was already facing international
criticism for its delay in implementing the EC directive of June 1989
outlawing insider trading. 7 The directive had stipulated July 1992 as the
deadline for all EC countries to ban the practice, but Germany had so far failed
to comply. The delay appears to have been the result of feuding between
28
Federal and state governments.
The financial community was increasingly vocal in its demands for
reforms to bring German regulatory standards in line with those of other
countries. The bankers believed that Frankfurt's attractiveness to foreign
investors was being badly harmed by its reputation for lax investor protection
legislation. Hilmar Kopper, the head of Deutsche Bank, argued that legislation
to ban insider trading "is clearly overdue and I cannot understand why it is
taking so long."' 29 A spokesman for Commerzbank A.G. said of the ban on
insider trading, "[w]e, the big banks, have always favored this because it puts
us on a par with the American and British markets. Markets today have to be
geared to the international investor. Everyone wants to know they have the
same protection in foreign markets that they have at home.""'
Finance Minister Theo Waigel said that "[t]he confidence of domestic and
foreign investors in how business is done is of considerable importance for the
attractiveness of a financial center." '' In addition to the competitive pressure
to improve standards of regulation, the German banking industry also
supported the idea of a securities and exchange commission because it could
represent their interests at meetings of international securities regulators.
International cooperation among securities regulators had become common
during the 1980s and early 1990s, especially through the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The German securities
industry was not represented at many of these meetings. This absence had
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several negative repercussions. One such repercussion was that Deutsche
Terminborse, a screen-based derivatives market, had found it difficult to
3
obtain foreign recognition of its products. 1
CONCLUSION: CONVERGENCE ON THE UNITED STATES MODEL?

Ten years ago, each of the four countries under discussion had a different
set of regulations designed to provide investor protection. The United States
relied on the SEC, a powerful supervisory watchdog to enforce regulations and
oversee the markets. The SEC was independent of other agencies and faced
no conflicts of interest. The British relied on a system of trust and integrity,
and on the structural protection of single capacity on the stock exchange. The
Japanese relied on informal supervision by a unified bureaucracy, but one that
had multiple functions and divided loyalties. The Germans relied on the
integrity of the universal banks. Over the past decade, the last three countries
have all introduced agencies like the SEC. The result is that regulatory
structures in all four countries are now much more similar to each other than
they have ever been. This evidence, then, indicates a significant degree of
policy convergence among countries where such convergence might not be
expected.
In all four countries, however, the primary catalyst for reform was
domestic politics: specifically, the failure of existing regulatory arrangements
to prevent the exploitation of investors by financial firms. These failures
produced financial and political scandals that prompted governments to
introduce new and more stringent regulations. Each government created an
agency devoted to the enforcement of the new regulations. However, the
impact of financial internationalization was significant in shaping the
responses of all countries except the United States. In Germany and Japan,
existing arrangements for investor protection were so bad and so clearly rigged
in favor of the powerful domestic financial intermediaries that foreigners were
deterred from doing business in either country. Moreover, the overseas
subsidiaries of Japanese companies suffered economic retaliation for the sins
of their parent companies. For both reasons, globalization altered the costbenefit calculus of the chief beneficiaries of inadequate investor protection
regulation, local banks and brokers, in favor of improved regulation. In
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addition, globalization made the SEC the regulatory model of choice. The
other countries did not adopt the American model as a result of American
coercion, but because of the power of example. The evidence, therefore, gives
us reason to be optimistic about the beneficial side-effects of economic
globalization.

